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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
Nos. 15-1627 and 15-1628  
_______________ 
ELNOR WHITEHEAD, as Executrix of the Estate of  
John Cavadus Whitehead, Sr. 
v. 
THE PULLMAN GROUP, LLC, 
Appellant in No. 15-1627 
___ 
BARBARA MCFADDEN, as Executrix of the Estate of  
Gene McFadden 
v. 
THE PULLMAN GROUP, LLC, 
Appellant in No. 15-1628 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Civ. Nos. 2-08-cv-00192 and 2-08-cv-00193) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
_______________ 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2015 
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Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed:  January 22, 2016) 
Armen Manasserian, Esq. 
3121 Chadney Drive 
California, CA  91206 
Felton T. Newell, Esq.  
The Newell Law Firm 
601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 4050 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sayde J. Ladov, Esq.  
Dolchin, Slotkin & Todd, P.C.  
50 South 16th Street, Suite 3530 
Philadelphia, PA  19102  
Attorneys for Appellees  
_______________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Singer-songwriters John Whitehead and Gene 
McFadden were “an integral part of the Philadelphia music 
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scene in the 1970s.”1  In 2002, appellant David Pullman 
approached Whitehead and McFadden about purchasing their 
song catalogue.2  The parties signed a contract but never 
finalized the sale.  Whitehead and McFadden passed away in 
2004 and 2006, respectively, and Pullman became embroiled 
in a series of disputes with their estates over ownership of the 
song catalogue.3  The parties eventually agreed to arbitration.  
Pullman, unhappy with the arbitral panel’s ruling, moved in 
the District Court to vacate the arbitration award on the 
ground that the panel had committed legal errors that made it 
impossible for him to present a winning case.  The District 
Court denied Pullman’s motions, and Pullman now appeals.  
Even if we were to agree with Pullman that the arbitrators 
misapplied the law—and we do not—legal error alone is not a 
sufficient basis to vacate the results of an arbitration.  
Accordingly, we will affirm.    
I. 
 Whitehead, McFadden, and Pullman entered into a 
contract in May of 2002.4  The agreement gave Pullman the 
exclusive option to purchase Whitehead and McFadden’s 
song catalogue following a 180-day period in which Pullman 
was to conduct due diligence about the catalogue’s value.5  
                                                 
1 Appellees’ Br. at 2 (punctuation modified).   
2 Pullman acted through his company, The Pullman Group, 
LLC.  We will refer to appellants collectively as “Pullman.”   
3 We will refer to appellees collectively as “the Estates.”       
4 See Appellants’ App. at 67–73 (a copy of the contract).   
5 Id. at 68 ¶¶ 2–3. 
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Once Pullman had completed his investigation, he had the 
right to terminate the transaction after giving written notice to 
Whitehead and McFadden.6  In the event that any dispute 
arose under the contract, the parties agreed to arbitration in 
New York City under the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.7 
  Pullman claims that his investigation turned up several 
tax liens that diminished the value of the song catalogue.8  
Pullman communicated his concerns to Whitehead and 
McFadden via telephone, at which point they allegedly told 
him that they would get back to him with more information.9  
Pullman contends that the two songwriters eventually told 
him that they did not want to consummate the transaction, 
thereby breaching their agreement.10 
 The Estates assert that all of this occurred 
unbeknownst to Whitehead and McFadden’s relatives.  After 
Whitehead and McFadden died, the Estates entered into 
separate negotiations to sell the song catalogue to Warner 
Chappell Music for $4.4 million.11  Shortly before completion 
of the transaction, the Estates received a letter from Pullman 
disclosing the existence of the May 2002 agreement.  A few 
                                                 
6 Id. at 71 ¶ 9.   
7 Id. ¶ 11.   
8 J.A. 84 (Arbitration Tr. at 215:18–216:6), 86 (222:12–19). 
9 Id. at 85 (Arbitration Tr. at 220:4–24). 
10 Id. at 87 (Arbitration Tr. at 227:15–228:4).   
11 Id. at 114–15 (Arbitration Tr. at 336:21–337:9).   
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months later, Warner Chappell withdrew its offer to purchase 
the song catalogue.12      
 Litigation ensued.  The Estates, claiming that Pullman 
had “torpedoed the deal with Warner Chappell in an effort to 
get McFadden and Whitehead to sell their catalogue to him 
for less money,” sued Pullman in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Philadelphia County.13  Pullman removed the case to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction.  The Estates ultimately sought (i) a declaratory 
judgment that Pullman’s contract with Whitehead and 
McFadden was void, and (ii) damages for intentional 
interference with contractual relations.  Pullman 
counterclaimed, seeking his own declaratory judgment and 
raising a claim for breach of the May 2002 agreement.14  The 
parties ultimately filed stipulations agreeing to send the case 
to arbitration.15   
 A panel of three arbitrators issued its final award in 
September of 2014.16  The panel dismissed the parties’ 
                                                 
12 Id. at 116–17 (Arbitration Tr. at 344:17–345:6).  
13 Appellees’ Br. at 5.   
14 J.A. 7 (containing the District Court’s summary of the 
case’s procedural history).   
15 Appellants’ App. at 75–76 (a copy of the stipulation).   
16 Id. at 2–11.  The arbitrators included the Hon. George C. 
Pratt, formerly a judge in the Eastern District of New York 
(1976–1982) and on the Second Circuit (1982–1995); the 
Hon. Richard D. Rosenbloom, formerly a justice on the New 
York State Supreme Court; and James Kobak, Jr., Esq. 
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breach-of-contract and tort claims and dismissed the Estates’ 
request for a declaratory judgment as moot.  While the panel 
agreed with Pullman that the May 2002 agreement with 
Whitehead and McFadden was a valid contract, it also 
concluded that Pullman had failed to introduce evidence 
sufficient to prove that he had ever notified Whitehead and 
McFadden that he had completed his due diligence.  
Consequently, the panel ruled that Pullman’s option to 
purchase the song catalogue had lapsed and the May 2002 
agreement was no longer enforceable.17   
 Pullman then moved to vacate the arbitral award.  The 
District Court denied the motions, leading to this appeal.18   
II. 
 Pullman’s primary argument is that the arbitral panel, 
which conducted its proceedings in accordance with New 
York law, erred in its application of that state’s so-called 
Dead Man’s Statute.19  Subject to certain exceptions, the 
                                                 
17 Id. at 4–5. 
18 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal 
from the District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
The District Court entered its final order on February 13, 
2015, and Pullman timely appealed.  See J.A. 6–15 (District 
Court order); id. at 2–4 (Pullman’s notice of appeal). 
19 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4519.  The Rule states:  
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Statute “disqualifies parties interested in litigation from 
testifying about personal transactions or communications with 
deceased or mentally ill persons.”20  Its purpose is “to protect 
the estate of the deceased from claims of the living who, 
through their own perjury, could make factual assertions 
which the decedent could not refute in court.”21  After the 
parties submitted briefs addressing whether the Dead 
Man’s Statute should apply to the arbitration, the panel ruled 
that (i) the Statute would apply, but (ii) rather than exclude 
otherwise inadmissible evidence from the hearing, the 
arbitrators would simply not “give it any weight” by “filtering 
                                                                                                             
 
 “Upon the trial of an action or the hearing upon 
the merits of a special proceeding, a party or a 
person interested in the event . . . shall not be 
examined as a witness in his own behalf or 
interest . . . against the executor, administrator 
or survivor of a deceased person . . . concerning 
a personal transaction or communication 
between the witness and the deceased 
person . . . except where the executor, 
administrator, survivor . . . or person so 
deriving title or interest is examined in his own 
behalf . . . concerning the same transaction or 
communication.”  
20 Poslock v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. of Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 666 
N.E.2d 528, 530 (N.Y. 1996). 




out the evidence in our own minds.”22 
 By causing the arbitrators to discount any testimony 
about oral communications between Pullman and his 
contractual counterparties, these rulings made it very difficult 
for Pullman to present a winning case.  Because the panel 
concluded that the import of the May 2002 agreement hinged 
on whether Pullman had notified Whitehead and McFadden 
that he had completed his due diligence, Pullman asserts that 
the only way he could have succeeded in the arbitration was 
by producing evidence that he had notified Whitehead and 
McFadden in writing about the results of his investigation.  
Pullman claims not to have done so for the entirely 
understandable reason that he did not anticipate that 
Whitehead and McFadden would die.  Pullman now argues 
that the arbitrators’ application of the Dead Man’s Statute was 
erroneous because it effectively made it impossible for him to 
prove his case, thereby depriving him of a fair hearing.    
III. 
 The District Court concluded that even if the arbitral 
panel erred in its application of the Dead Man’s Statute, that 
error was not sufficient to vacate the results of the parties’ 
arbitration.  We agree.23  
                                                 
22 J.A. 31 (Arbitration Tr. at 4:3–12). 
23 When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to 
vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal conclusions 
de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  Sutter v. 
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012), 
as amended (Apr. 4, 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 
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 We begin with the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
specifies four circumstances under which a district court can 
vacate an arbitral award.24  The Supreme Court has held that 
these are the “exclusive grounds” for moving to vacate an 
award in a district court.25  One of the four grounds is 
“misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy.”26  Pullman asserts that the 
arbitral panel erred under this subsection by refusing to 
consider testimony about Pullman’s oral communications 
with Whitehead and McFadden. 
 Contrary to Pullman’s argument, we have long held 
that for an error to justify vacating an arbitration award, it 
must be “not simply an error of law, but [one] which so 
affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was 
deprived of a fair hearing.”27  We have also spoken of 
procedural irregularities so prejudicial that they result in 
“fundamental unfairness.”28  Here, we discern no unfairness 
at all.  The arbitral panel reasonably chose not to consider 
potentially self-serving testimony about communications with 
persons who are no longer able to present their side of the 
                                                 
24 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
25 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 
(2008). 
26 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 
27 Newark Stereotypers’ Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning 
Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 1968).   
28 Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 995 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
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story.   
 Nor are we persuaded by Pullman’s argument that the 
only way he could have succeeded before the arbitrators was 
to have documented his communications with Whitehead and 
McFadden in anticipation of the fact that they might die.  
Pullman makes this assertion as though it illuminates some 
manifest injustice.  To the contrary, the May 2002 agreement 
specified that any dispute about its meaning was to be 
arbitrated in New York.  It was entirely foreseeable—even in 
2002—that an arbitral panel comprised of New York jurists 
might apply that state’s evidentiary rules, including the Dead 
Man’s Statute.   
 Pullman also argues that, even if the arbitral panel’s 
decision to apply the Statute was reasonable, the Estates 
“opened the door” to testimony about oral communications 
with Whitehead and McFadden by introducing evidence on 
the same subject.  This argument is unavailing.  Pullman is of 
course correct that a party generally cannot use an evidentiary 
rule as both sword and shield.  Even so, that principle is 
meant to prevent one party from gaining an unfair advantage; 
it has no application to the present circumstances, in which 
the arbitral panel assured the parties that it would “filter out” 
any inadmissible testimony.  The purpose of the panel’s 
ruling was to make the parties’ task easier by permitting them 
to present their respective cases without having to worry 
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about triggering any evidentiary tripwires.29  In view of the 
arbitrators’ promise to “filter out” any problematic testimony, 
it is fair to say that the panel reached the same result as it 
would have if there had been no testimony whatsoever about 
conversations with Whitehead and McFadden.  There was no 
“door” for the Estates to open at all.      
IV. 
 Lastly, Pullman contends that the arbitrators’ actions 
amounted to a “manifest disregard of the law.”30  Whether 
this standard survived the Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Mattel that the Federal Arbitration Act provides the 
“exclusive grounds” for vacating an arbitral award is an open 
question.31  A circuit split has since developed, and this Court 
has not yet weighed-in.32  We decline the opportunity to do so 
                                                 
29 See J.A. 85 (Arbitration Tr. at 218:14–25) (in which the 
chairman of the panel clarifies that the panel is “not 
preventing anyone from talking about” evidence otherwise 
inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute because it is 
“almost impossible to try to filter out [such evidence] by 
question and answer”).   
30 Appellants’ Br. at 21–23. 
31 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (declining to resolve the issue).   
32 See, e.g., Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 
F. App’x 168, 173–74 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining the 
current state of the law); Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music 
Franchising, LLC v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172, 176–77 




 Indeed, even if we were to consider Pullman’s 
arguments under the rubric of “manifest disregard of the 
law,” we still would not arrive where Pullman wants us to go.  
The manifest disregard standard requires more than legal 
error.  Rather, the arbitrators’ decision “must fly in the face of 
clearly established legal precedent,”33 such as where an 
arbitrator “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing 
legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to 
it.”34  We have therefore described this standard as 
“extremely deferential.”35  In these circumstances, where the 
arbitrators were fully cognizant of the Dead Man’s Statute, 
permitted the parties to brief the issue, and then applied the 
Statute in a way designed to promote efficiency and fairness 
in the arbitral proceedings, we see no legal error at all—much 
less one that would rise to the level of manifest disregard of 
the law. 
V. 
 Pullman twice agreed to settle disputes arising under 
the May 2002 agreement through arbitration, first in the 
agreement itself and again by stipulating to do so in the 
District Court.  Having made that commitment, he is now 
bound by the terms of his bargain.  Because we see no 
                                                 
33 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 
F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). 
34 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). 
35 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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unfairness in the arbitrators’ conduct, we will affirm the 
judgments of the District Court. 
